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Abstract
We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation
by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely
repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by random assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation
task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group
and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full
cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group
affiliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases.
This suggests that group effects are less likely to emerge when players cannot easily
observe and compare characteristics on which to base categorizations and behaviors.
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Introduction

Social identity theory elaborated in Tajfel et al. (1971) and Tajfel and Turner
(1979) asserts that an individual’s sense of self gets strengthened when she
is affiliated with a high status group. Behavioral economists have incorporated group membership (or, group-identity) factors into theories of decision
making (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and have measured their impact in the
lab. There is mounting evidence that group-identity affects behavior in dictator games (Chen and Li, 2009; Fatas et al., 2018), public goods games (Eckel
and Grossman, 2005), trust games (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009), and
coordination games (Brooks et al., 2018), to give some examples. A minimal
categorization (see Chen and Li, 2009) is generally enough to generate ingroup
favoritism and outgroup hostility.
At the heart of this finding is a human tendency to use observable differences to categorize selves and others into groups, and then condition actions
based on this differentiation.1 Group identity experiments generally make it
quite easy to observe and compare group characteristics and behaviors, facilitating the task of making inter-group comparisons—an important mechanism
behind ingroup biases (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Our experiment offers an
attempt to stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation. We ask: do group effects emerge in strategic settings
where it is not easy to observe and compare characteristics on which to base
categorizations and behaviors?
To do so, we artificially induce group identity in laboratory economies populated by twelve strangers who are artificially divided into three groups. These
1

We give credit to an anonymous referee for making this point and for providing a useful
commentary, which is partly reflected in this paragraph.
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strangers meet in random pairs an indefinite number of times (a supergame),
which is unlike the typical finite-duration experimental design.2 Each encounter consists of a helping game, in which one randomly selected person
(the “producer”) has the option to suffer a small cost to bestow a large benefit
upon the other (the “consumer”). That is: the producer is free to cooperate or
defect. This choice can be based on the consumer’s group affiliation, but not
on their identity, past behavior, or group’s behavior—all of which are unobservable. This setting precludes behavior based on reciprocity and reputation
because the history of play of individuals and the group they belong to always
remain shrouded. An outcome is efficient if all producers always cooperate,
independent of group affiliations, i.e., if there is full cooperation. Players are
notified if cooperation is less than full in a period.
The indefinite repetition design ensures that full cooperation is a sequential
equilibrium because players can adopt a trigger strategy based on the social
norm proposed in Kandori (1992). It consists of a “rule of cooperation” (always
cooperate) to be used in equilibrium, and an irreversible “rule of punishment”
(always defect) that is triggered if someone breaks the first rule. It is this
threat of permanent, economy-wide punishment that supports efficient play.
We are interested in assessing if a minimal categorization design can lead
strangers to engage in discriminatory behavior, acting differently with insiders
than outsiders. In particular, do group effects emerge from the start of the
supergame? If so, do they persist as the game progresses? Does going beyond
the minimal group categorization by adding an economic inequality aspect
2

For example, subjects in Chen and Li (2009) played between seven and twelve games (a
mix of dictator and ultimatum games), nine decisions in Fatas et al. (2018) (a mix of
dictator games and risky choices), fifteen games in Eckel and Grossman (2005), six games
in Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009), and ten rounds of a stag-hunt game in Brooks et
al. (2018). We found just one group-identity experiment involving an indefinitely repeated
game, the two-player prisoner’s dilemma in Li and Liu (2017).
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influence ingroup/outgroup cooperation?
In our design, group affiliation is artificially induced by randomly assigning
subjects to three color-coded groups. The identity induced by this categorization is then reinforced by having subjects interact ingroup in fixed pairs for
two consecutive supergames. In these partners’ economies subjects can attain
high cooperation by leveraging reciprocity and reputation mechanisms. This
payoff-relevant stage should facilitate the creation of trust among insiders,
meaning that subjects should come to expect a high frequency of cooperation
from ingroup participants. We then mix subjects into economies of twelve
strangers (four per group) for two more supergames. Here, there is random
rematching into pairs in each round of play. In these meetings, producers can
see the consumer’s color before choosing, so can discriminate based on group
affiliation. Yet, the past conduct of individuals and groups is not observable.
Hence, these strangers do not have observable characteristics other than the
counterpart’s color on which to base their discrimination. Intergroup biases
cannot depend on reputation or reciprocity mechanisms at the individual or
group level.
In the Equal treatment group affiliation is payoff irrelevant—all players
face the same payoff matrix and—when they interact as strangers—they are
randomly assigned to a series of ingroup and outgroup meetings. We use
this within-subject variation to investigate if a minimal categorization design
supports group effects. To determine if going beyond the minimal group categorization influences behavior we use instead a between-subjects design. In the
Unequal treatment the gains from cooperation vary across groups. Adding
this payoff-relevant aspect to the induced categorization introduces inequality in economic opportunity. This increases the observable characteristics on
which players can base their categorizations and discriminatory behaviors, po4

tentially affecting the psychological basis for group identity effects over and
above the minimal categorization.
The analysis of the data reveals no evidence of group biases in our economies
of strangers. We do not detect discriminatory behavior in the initial rounds of
play, meaning that if psychological group biases exist, they are not sufficiently
strong to affect interaction at the start of the economy. Group effects are also
not detected in later rounds of the supergame, as we do not observe choices
being based on the insider/outsider distinction. This applies when we restrict
attention only to meetings in which the decision maker had not suffered from
a defection earlier in the supergame, or to meetings after suffering a defection.
In the first kind of meetings decision makers have no explicit reason to sanction others by defecting. In the second kind of meetings subjects did lower
their cooperation frequency—as a way to sanction the earlier defection—and
were as likely to defect with insiders as well as outsiders. In fact, once defections occur in economies of strangers cooperation simply declines without
recovering, as evidence also in other experiments with strangers (e.g., Camera
and Casari, 2009). This suggests that group effects are less likely to emerge in
settings where players cannot easily find observable characteristics, other than
group affiliation, on which to base their categorizations and discriminatory
behaviors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we review the relevant experimental literature, in section 3 we describe the experimental design. Section 4
presents the theory and offers testable research hypotheses. Section 5 contains
the results and section 6 provides a final discussion.

5

2

Related literature

A large economics literature investigated the influence of naturally-existing
or artificially induced group-identity in the lab in a variety of experimental tasks. In a few experiments participants are grouped according to their
naturally-existing social identities, such as political or social affiliation for
instance (Brooks et al., 2018). In the majority of experiments, instead, the experimenter induces group-identity artificially (see Goette et al., 2012). There
are two ways to accomplish this task. One is to divide subjects into groups,
either at random (e.g., by randomly assigning a color label) or on the basis
of some payoff-irrelevant element of commonality (e.g., aesthetic preferences).
The available evidence suggests that this mechanism of artificially-inducing
group-identity is rather weak and does not significantly affect behavior (Charness et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2005). A preferable alternative is to
make subjects undergo a group task, where same-group members share common experiences, that precedes the experimental task proper; this task can
be payoff-irrelevant. There is some evidence that artificially-inducing groupidentity in this second manner is more likely to affect behavior, although the
empirical evidence is inconclusive.3
In-group favoritism is a typical finding, meaning that subjects act more
cooperatively with members of one own’s group (in-group members) as compared to subjects with a different identity (out-group members) (e.g., see the
meta-analysis in Lane, 2016).
3

For example, Eckel and Grossman (2005, p. 373) report that cooperation increase significantly when group identity is enhanced by having group members cooperate on achieving
an unrelated goal before playing a public good game, as compared to treatments without no
prior interaction among team members. On the other hand, the differences between treatments with and without common experiences are minimal in Chen and Li (2009, p.450),
who report that a problem-solving stage (an online chat) tended to increase self-reported
group attachment but did not have a strong effect on behavior.
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For example, in Chen and Li (2009) subjects that are matched to an ingroup member are more likely to choose actions that maximize social-welfare,
to reward good behavior and less likely to punish misbehavior, as compared to
subjects that are matched to out-group members. Morita and Servàtka (2013)
find that group-identity strengthens individuals’ altruistic preferences towards
in-group members and thus can help to resolve the hold-up problem. Groupidentity increases contributions in a public goods game (Eckel and Grossman,
2005), in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (Weng and Carlsson, 2015),
and improves coordination in the Minimum Effort coordination game (Chen
and Chen, 2011). Charness et al. (2007) find, that group-identity affects the
subjects’ behavior both in a Battle of the Sexes game as well as in a Prisoner’s dilemma. Daskalova (2018) reports the effect of group-identity on a
joint-decision-making task. There is also evidence that individuals display
preference conformism in non-strategic settings, as subjects tend to base their
decisions on those of peers (Fatas et al., 2018).
A first aspect of these designs is their focus on interaction that is either
one-shot (e.g., Charness et al., 2007), or of short duration and with a restricted horizon (e.g., Weng and Carlsson, 2015). An open question is whether
artificially induced group-identity biases are permanent or if they are shortlived, and dissipate as subjects share common experiences over the long-haul.
A second aspect of existing studies of group-identity is a focus on decisional
situations in which there are only a few players (often two), who can easily
differentiate group behavior, and therefore can reciprocate both discrimination and favoritism. In this scenario, biases can be self-reinforcing. The open
question is whether ingroup biases emerge when reciprocation is impossible because group conduct is opaque. The answer to these questions matters from an
external validity perspective because interaction in society is generally open7

ended, and it often has an anonymous structure that precludes reputation or
reciprocity.
To this end, we design interaction as taking place among many strangers—
so that neither individuals nor groups can develop reputations—and over an
open-ended horizon. As noted earlier, we are aware of just one group-identity
experiment that involves an indefinitely repeated game, Li and Liu (2017). The
study reports evidence of ingroup favoritism in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where
two partners exclusively interact ingroup or, alternatively, outgroup, for an
average of 3 to 4 rounds. Instead, we contribute to the debate about group
identity in indefinitely repeated games by studying twelve-person economies of
strangers who interact both ingroup and outgroup for long horizons, 20 rounds
on average. In our design, reciprocation (direct or indirect) is impossible because group-affiliation and IDs of decision-makers remain hidden. As a result,
neither favoritism nor discrimination can be equilibria, in contrast with designs
of supergames among partners. Removing individual reputation is important
because the experimental literature suggests that individual reputation dominates artificially induced group-identity biases in finite-horizon games. In that
case, subjects can self-select into groups of like-minded individuals by developing individual reputations.4 The open question is thus if group-identity biases
play a role when self-selection is difficult or impossible, as is often the case in
modern industrialized societies. Our experiment can provide an answer because individuals’ past conduct remains unobservable for the duration of the
4

For example, in a public goods game where subjects can be excluded from the group, Charness et al. (2014) find little evidence that artificially induced and subsequently strengthened
group-identity determines exclusion choices, because the probability of exclusion primarily depends on the subjects’ past contributions. This result is in line with experiments
on endogenous group formation without group identity, where the ability to identify and
isolate free riders, supports the formation of cooperative groups; see Ahn et al. (2009),
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Güth et al. (2007), or Maier-Rigaud et. al. (2010).

8

supergame, and subjects can neither self-select into a desired group nor can
be individually targeted for exclusion.5

3

Experimental design

We start by describing the Equal treatment, which is our baseline. A session in the experiment comprises twenty-four subjects who play a sequence
of four supergames where the size and composition of the interaction group
is exogenous. At the start of the session, subjects are randomly assigned to
an eight-person set that is color-coded (green, red, and blue). This random
assignment, which is permanent for the session, is a weak form of artificially inducing group-identity (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), which we aim to strengthen
through a payoff-relevant task carried out in the first two supergames, as we
next explain.
A supergame: Each supergame consists of 18 rounds plus an indefinite
number of additional rounds. After 18 rounds, another round is played with
probability β = 0.75 and, otherwise, the supergame ends for everyone in the
session.6 This ensures the same minimum length of 18 rounds for all supergames, and an expected duration of 21 rounds with a tight standard deviation of 3.5 rounds.
In each round, each subject faces a “helping game” in a pair composed
5

There are other difference with Li and Liu (2017). In particular, the number of groups (two
vs. three in ours) and the mechanism used to form group identity after the initial random
color assignment. The group manipulation protocol in Li and Liu (2017) involves pre-play
communication about a payoff-irrelevant task as in Chen and Li (2009). By contrast, we
use a group task that is payoff-relevant, does not involve communication, and is part of an
initial phase of the experiment—subjects interact in-group, and in fixed pairs.
6
This probability was common knowledge in the session. Because supergames started and
ended simultaneously for all participants in a session, all participants in the session played
exactly the same number of rounds.
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of a “producer” and a “consumer.” Roles are randomly assigned in the first
round of the supergame and then deterministically alternate so that in each
round half of the subjects of any color are producers and half are consumers.
In each pair, the consumer has no choice to make; see Table 1. The producer
can choose Cooperate or Defect. By choosing Defect she earns 6 points, while
the consumer earns 3. By choosing Cooperate she earns 0 points, and the
consumer 13 + a points.
Table 1: Payoffs in a consumer-producer pair
Producer’s choice
Defect
3
6

Payoff to Consumer
Payoff to Producer

Cooperate
13 + a
0

Notes: In the experiment a = 0 for partners and a = 3 for strangers.

The parameter a depends on whether the counterpart is fixed or randomly
changes during the supergame. Specifically, there are two kinds of economies,
“partners” and “strangers.” We set a = 0 for partners and a = 3 for strangers.
Under partners, subjects interact in-group and with a fixed counterpart so the
economy has 2 participants. Under strangers, we form 12-person matching sets
by selecting four subjects from each color, who are randomly rematched into 6
pairs in each round. Here, economies have 12 participants who interact both ingroup and out-group depending on the outcome of matching process; subjects
are strangers because past actions and identities remain hidden. Producers
can see the consumer’s color so can discriminate based on group affiliation,
but consumers cannot see the producer’s color (see the screenshots Figs. B1B2 in Appendix B) so the color-coded groups cannot develop a reputation.7
7

This implies that decision-makers cannot act based on the observed correlation between
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Summing up, a partners setting offers the possibility to easily attain moderate
gains, while a strangers setting offers larger gains from cooperation without
the possibility to leverage reputation or reciprocity mechanisms.
At the end of each round strangers can see if all pairs of their economy attained the same outcome or not. This information allows subjects to determine
if every producer in the economy cooperated or not.8
A session: A session consists of four separate supergames, and two phases;
see Fig. 1. Phase 1 is an identity-strengthening phase that comprises supergames 1-2. Here, subjects interact as partners to facilitate cooperation
through reciprocity and reputation. Phase 2 comprises supergames 3-4, when
subjects interact as strangers, both in and outside their group. To the extent
that partners cooperate more than strangers, Phase 1 can foster a sense of
trust in those who share the player’s same color, thus strengthening groupidentity. To minimize spillover effects from earlier supergames to subsequent
supergames, economies are constructed so that counterparts from previous
supergames cannot be met in subsequent supergames.9
group-affiliation and cooperation, thus breaking possible feedback effects reinforcing an
initial group bias. This is necessary to determine if color-based discrimination is primarily
stemming from in-group biases, or if it is the result of self-reinforcing feedback effects that
rely on forms of history-dependent, selective punishments (e.g., defect out-group because
the player saw that out-group producers defected more often than in-group producers).
8
See the column “Same Outcome In All Pairs” at the bottom left of the screen in Figs.
B1-B2 in Appendix B. This allows subjects in 12-person economies to monitor defections
occurring elsewhere in the economy, not only their meeting, while maintaining anonymity.
For example, if the outcome is C in the subject’s meeting and the column “Same Outcome
In All Pairs” reports NO, then this means that some producer in the economy selected D
this round. This is equivalent to raising a red flag warning that someone defected, which
can facilitate coordination on a punishment mechanism in large groups. In fact, it ensures
that the condition sufficient to support full cooperation as an equilibrium is independent
of the economy’s size—as demonstrated in the next Section .
9
Running two consecutive supergames with each economy configuration minimizes possible
hurdles to subjects’ proper comprehension of the two different economic environments.
Indeed, the 12-player economies constitute a rather complex decisional environment as
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Figure 1: A session
Phase 1: 2-player economies
(fixed match, in-group)
12 economies
1
A round of play

Phase 2: 12-player economies
(random match, in- and out-group)

12 economies

2 economies

2 economies

2

3

4

Supergames

Treatments: Our baseline treatment is described above. In the Unequal
treatment, we manipulate the importance of group affiliation by making consumers’ cooperation payoffs color-dependent. This is done using a symmetric
mean-preserving spread of Equal payoffs: green consumers earn 11 points,
red 13, and blue 15. Neither the parameter a, nor producers’ payoffs are manipulated. This gives rise to inequality of economic opportunity: everyone
can gain from cooperation, but some players can gain more while others less.
In this case, group affiliation has a concrete consequence for prospective payoffs. By comparing the Equal to the Unequal case, we can determine if
the payoff (ir)relevance of group affiliation affects the emergence or strength
compared to the fixed partnerships of Phase 1. This project is part of a larger research
agenda about whether inequality—payoff relevant or not—might affect cooperation and the
endogenous integration into larger, heterogeneous economies. For this reason, each session
included a fifth supergame with an endogenous size and composition of the interaction
set—either fixed pairs as in Phase 1 or larger economies as in Phase 2, but of a larger
size. The instructions (see Appendix B) informed participants that they would have an
opportunity to alter size and composition of their interaction set in supergame 5, without
providing specific details until the start of supergame 5 in order not to influence behavior
in supergames 1-4. Given the scope of this paper this last segment of the session is not
part of the present analysis. Camera et al. (2021) discusses an experiment that studies if
and how size and distribution of potential gains from integrating groups into a large and
potentially quite profitable economy influences individuals’ inclination to integrate and to
cooperate to reap the benefits it can offer.
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of group-identity biases.
Experimental procedures: The experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory at Chapman University. We recruited
192 undergraduate students between 2/2017 and 11/2017. We ran 4 sessions
per treatment, each with 24 participants. Subjects were informed that at the
end of the experiment one of the five supergames would be randomly selected,
via public randomization. The points the subjects earned in this supergame
were converted into dollars (1 point is worth USD 0.18). On average, subjects
received about USD 21 in salient earnings, a USD 7 show-up fee, and about
USD 2 from a post-instruction incentivized quiz (included in Appendix B).
One session lasted about 1 hour and 40 minutes. Instructions are included
in Appendix B, were recorded in advance and played aloud at the beginning
of a session, while participants could follow on individual copies. For the instructions neutral language was used. The experiment was programmed using
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). No eye contact was possible between
participants. Demographic data was collected in an anonymous survey at
the session’s end. Given our design, the experimental data indicates that the
smallest detectable value of the treatment effect size is 0.037 with a power of
0.8 (significance level of 0.05), and 0.0428 when the power is 0.9.10
10

We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this calculation. The idea is to find out
if we can detect economically meaningful group effects, if there were any. We ran power
calculations to estimate the minimum group effect size we can detect with our design.
The power analysis test is run for paired means, using the mean and standard deviation
taken from the experimental data for the alternative hypothesis. We use the test for
paired data because we have measurements on the same economy for in-group and outgroup interaction, so the test accounts for the dependence between the two groups of
observations. Fixing one 12-player economy as our unit of observation, we have N = 32
observations each for in-group and out-group interaction (both treatments pooled). In
the data, outgroup cooperation is 0.507 as compared to 0.527 ingroup, with standard
deviations of, respectively, 0.204 and 0.203. The null hypothesis is that mean cooperation
observed in-group is identical to out-group. The alternative hypothesis is that of a group
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4

Theoretical considerations and hypotheses

According to standard theory, participants could attain maximum profits in
every experimental economy. We summarize this in the following:
Proposition 1. Full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in every economy
and in every treatment of the experiment.
The proof, which can be found in Appendix A, relies on tacitly coordinating on a “grim” strategy that, in economies of strangers, leverages the availability of anonymous public monitoring. This strategy works as follows: all
participants should start the supergame by following the strategy “always cooperate” with the tacit threat of switching to “always defect,” if any producer
defects at any point. If all players adopt the grim strategy, then full cooperation is an equilibrium when the probability of continuation β is sufficiently
high.11 In that case, no producer, of any color, has an incentive to deviate
in equilibrium—defecting instead of cooperating. Moreover, no producer has
an incentive to deviate from following the grim sanction off equilibrium because “always defect” is an equilibrium of the original game (a best response
to “always defect” by everyone else).
Following the discussion in Kandori (1992), we say that a social norm of
cooperation emerges when the grim strategy is adopted by everyone in the
economy. This norm is based on two distinct and complementary rules of
conduct. The first one is a “rule of cooperation,” according to which everyone
identity effect. We use the outgroup mean 0.507 as our alternative “pre-treatment” mean,
and the ingroup mean of 0.527 as our alternative “post-treatment” mean. The standard
deviation of the difference is 0.072. The results of the power test suggest that our design
has enough power to detect economically meaningful group effects, as it can detect quite
small differences in cooperation, up to a value of about 0.04.
11
The threshold is 0.55, approximately. The continuation probability in the experiment is
0.75. Hence, assuming risk neutrality, full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in all
supergames of all treatments.
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should cooperate when they are a producer, starting from the very beginning
of the supergame. The second component is a “rule of punishment”—stop
cooperating forever—which should be followed only if someone breaks the first
rule, and, hence, should never be observed in equilibrium.
Because consumers cannot observe producer’s group affiliation, and players
cannot see statistics about the relative cooperativeness of the three groups, we
have an additional result.
Corollary 1. Neither ingroup discrimination nor favoritism is part of an equilibrium in economies of strangers.
The proof is obtained by deriving a contradiction. Suppose the following
discriminatory equilibrium exists in Phase 2 economies: players always cooperate with insiders, and defect with outsiders. Since decision-makers’ colors
are hidden, it is optimal for a producer to deviate with insiders because her
color remains undetected and she cannot be individually punished. If so, deviating to D in insider meetings is optimal, contrary to our conjecture. The
same holds true for behavior favoring outsiders, instead of insiders. It follows
that to support a cooperative equilibrium players must sanction a defection
by defecting in every future meeting. This means that if group effects emerge
in the experiment they are likely due to a social identity explanation and not
epistemic considerations.
What is central to our design is that the grim strategy can be used equally
effectively in all economies. However, Phase 1 economies can also rely on
reciprocity and reputation to support cooperation (e.g., tit-for-tat). Previous experiments suggest that this supports high cooperation.12 If so, Phase 1
interaction should promote cooperation, trust in the group’s affiliates, which
12

Cooperation rates are higher among partners than strangers, even when public monitoring
is available (Camera and Casari, 2009). Economies of strangers suffer from strategic
uncertainty that reduces trust (see the discussion in Bigoni et al., 2019)
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should strengthen group identity. We rely on Phase 2 to uncover possible
in-group (or, intergroup) biases, by determining if producers condition their
cooperation on the consumer’s group affiliation. Of particular interest is the
possibility that producers cooperate more in-group than out-group meetings,
something that emerges in one-shot or finitely repeated experiments where
group-identity is payoff-irrelevant (Charness et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman,
2005) and also payoff-relevant (Weng and Carlsson, 2015). We thus hypothesize that group effects should emerge in both treatments, form the start of
a supergame. Recalling that half of the subjects make their initial choice in
round 1, and the rest in round 2, we formulate the following.
H 1. In the first two rounds of a Phase 2 supergame, in-group meetings exhibit
higher cooperation than out-group meetings.
To formulate hypotheses about actions past the initial one, consider that
Li and Liu (2017) uncover in-group favoritism in two-player indefinite horizon
Prisoner’s Dilemmas where group-identity is payoff-irrelevant. This suggest
that in-group/out-group effects should also be observed in our experiment,
once players move past their initial choice.
H 2. In the average round of a Phase 2 supergame, in-group meetings exhibit
higher cooperation than out-group meetings.
Finally, note that strangers who interact indefinitely can base their choices
on their personal experience in the supergame (e.g., see Camera et al., 2013).
The norm discussed above suggests that suffering a defection should trigger a
permanent decline in cooperation, i.e., a permanent switch to a punishment
mode. A reasonable hypothesis is that social identity should also emerge
during the punishment phase because if subjects have a motive to discriminate
against outsiders under normal circumstances, then this motive should be
reinforced when there is evidence of free riding in the community.
16

H 3. After suffering a defection in Phase 2, subjects’ actions are consistent
with group identity effects.

5

Results

We start by reporting outcomes in Phase 1, when subjects interacted in-group,
in fixed pairs.
Result 1. Cooperation in Phase 1 was similar across treatments and across
groups within a treatment.
Evidence is provided by Fig. 2 and Table 2. Fig. 2 reports the distribution
of cooperation rates in Phase 1, by treatment. One observation is one economy
in a supergame, which in Phase 1 consisted of a fixed pair of homogeneous
color. Each marker reports the average cooperation rate in the supergame,
separated by group affiliation (color). Overall, average cooperation in Phase
1 was 62% and 67% in, respectively, Equal and Unequal. Fig. 2 reveals that
in each treatment about 1/3 of economies achieved full cooperation (0.36 and
0.34, respectively), while the share of economies that coordinated on full defection was close to zero (0.03 in each treatment). In other words, Phase 1
was a similarly highly cooperative phase, in both treatments.
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Figure 2: Cooperation in Phase 1 Economies
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0
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a supergame of Phase 1 (N = 32 per color, per treatment). Each marker reports the average cooperation rate in the economy during the supergame; this measure ranges from 0 when there was full defection (D was selected in each
round of the supergame) to 1 when there was full cooperation (C was selected in each round
of the supergame).

Fig. 2 suggests that group affiliation did not affect behavior when colors
were payoff-relevant in the Unequal treatment (right panel). In that treatment Green players had the least economic benefit from cooperating (11 points
as consumers), while Blue players had the greatest incentive (15 points as consumers). The figure does not reveal a positive association between potential
gains from cooperation and cooperation rates; except for a few observations,
the markers show substantial overlap. Interestingly, when colors were payoff
irrelevant (left panel), Blue and Green players behaved similarly while Red
players cooperated more than others.
To establish the statistical significance of these observations we exploit the
longitudinal structure of the data, which gives us repeated choices for each
subject. Table 2 reports the marginal effects from panel logit regressions with
random effects, ran separately for each treatment (first four columns), and
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pooled (last two columns). Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at the session level to account for possible dependencies within a session. The
panel variable is a subject in Phase 1. The dependent variable takes value
1 if the subject cooperated in a round in which she was a producer, and is
0 otherwise. The factor variable Affiliation identifies the group affiliation of
the decision maker (the base case is Green), which is the exogenous source of
variation in the experiment.
To determine if and how suffering D affected the subsequent probability of
cooperating, we include the Suffered D and Lag n indicator variables. Suffered
D takes value 1 starting the round after the first instance in which the subject
suffered D as a consumer (0 otherwise). Because the subject might react with
delay or revert back to cooperate after a while, we include five Lag n indicator
variables, for n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, each of which takes the value 1 for a choice
made 2n − 1 rounds after suffering D (0 otherwise).13 The Choice # regressor
captures possible time trends, as it takes value n at the nth choice of the
subject14 , the Supergame 2 takes value 1 in the second supergame (else, 0, the
base case), while individual controls consist of two measures of understanding
of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the post-instruction quiz),
and sex.
13

This econometric technique is used in Camera and Casari (2009). The sum of the coefficients Suffered D+Lag n identifies the average reaction 2n − 1 rounds after the event
(subjects made choices every other round). With these five sums we can trace the subjects’ response between 1 and 9 rounds after suffering the initial D, while the Suffered D
coefficient captures the response 10+ rounds after suffering D, i.e., the long-run effect on
the probability of cooperating after falling victim to a defection.
14
Half of the subjects made a choice in odd rounds and half in even rounds.
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Table 2: Cooperation in Phase 1: Marginal Effects
Dep. var.
=1 if C (0 if D)
Affiliation
Red
Blue
Unequal treatment
Punishment
Suffered D
Lag 1
Lag 2
Lag 3
Lag 4
Lag 5
Supergame 2
Choice #
Controls
N

(1) Equal

(2) Unequal

Coeff.

S.E.

0.076
-0.026

(0.071) 0.014
(0.083) 0.002

-0.406***
0.068***
0.023
0.050**
0.033
0.016
0.014
0.019**
Yes
1884

(0.019)
(0.016)
(0.045)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.012)
(0.016)
(0.008)

Coeff.

-0.502***
0.125***
0.078***
0.082***
0.063***
0.060***
0.054*
0.033***
Yes
1944

S.E.

(3) Pooled
Coeff.

S.E.

-0.046

(0.054)

-0.437***
0.085***
0.044**
0.057***
0.041***
0.033***
0.031**
0.023***
Yes
3828

(0.037)
(0.011)
(0.022)
(0.016)
(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.004)

(0.037)
(0.051)

(0.042)
(0.040)
(0.012)
(0.023)
(0.018)
(0.014)
(0.029)
(0.005)

Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects (for the intercept) at the individual
level and robust standard errors (SE) adjusted for clustering at the session level. One
observation = one producer in a round of supergames 1 and 2. Dependent variable = 1
if C chosen, 0 otherwise. Base case = Green player, supergame 1. Controls: sex and
two standardized measures of understanding of instructions from the incentivized postinstruction quiz (response time and wrong answers). Marginal effects are computed at the
regressors’ mean value (at base levels for factor variables). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Group affiliation does not significantly affect the probability to choose cooperation in Unequal (panel 2). In Equal (panel 1) it partially affected Red
subjects who cooperated more than Blue (Wald test, p-value=.0454) but not
Green subjects. Cooperation was also statistically similar across treatments;
see the Unequal coefficient in panel (3).15
Three other points can be made. First, subjects switched from a cooper15

Table B1 in Appendix B reports similar results when we use a more conservative GLM
specification, where the unit of observation is one economy of Phase 1, and the dependent
variable is average cooperation in a supergame.
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ative to a long-lasting punishment mode if their partner defected; the coefficient on Suffered D is a large and highly significant negative number. We
can reject the null hypothesis that the sum Suffered D+Lag n is zero for each
n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Wald tests, p-value < 0.001 for all tests.) Second, in Phase 1
subjects learned to cooperate with their partner (the Choice # coefficient is
positive and significant), an outcome that is visually apparent in Fig. B3, in
Appendix B. Third, repeating the interaction a second time with a different
partner did not decrease cooperation and sometimes significantly increased it
(the coefficient on Supergame 2 ). Taken together, this evidence suggests that
subjects learned to trust and to cooperate with their partner in the long-run,
in Phase 1. This view is reinforced by considering the first action taken in
a supergame. We say that a participant has an uncooperative inclination if
her first choice is D despite not having seen that choice in that supergame
(an initial producer in round 1, or an initial consumer in round 2 who experienced C in round 1). The share of uncooperative participants is similar across
treatments in supergame 1, and declined by more than 50% in the second
supergame (0.43 and 0.42 in supergame 1 of Equal and Unequal, and 0.15
and 0.2 in supergame 2).
Overall, these findings suggest that Phase 1 of the experiment contributed
to build trust in the subject’s group affiliates, in both treatments. To uncover possible intergroup biases, we now focus on Phase 2, which is when
subjects participated in 12-person economies, with random rematching, in- or
out-group, in each round. We start by considering the first choice of subjects
in these mixed-affiliation economies.
Result 2. In Phase 2, producers did not condition their initial choice on the
consumer’s group affiliation.
Evidence is provided in Table 3, which reports the marginal effects from
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logit regressions with random effects at the individual level. Robust standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the session level. One observation corresponds to the first choice of a subject in Phase 2 supergames, i.e., the round
1 choice of initial producers and round 2 choice of initial consumers. The dependent variable is set to 1 if C is selected (0, if D). The In-Group indicator
takes the value 1 for in-group meetings (else 0, the base case) and is interacted
with the Affiliation factor variable identifying the color of the decision maker
(Green is the base case).
As variation in Phase 1 experience might affect initial choices in Phase
2, we follow the modeling technique used in Bigoni et al. (2019) and include
the indicator Full C in Phase 1. This fixed effect takes value 1 if the subject
experienced full cooperation in at least one Phase 1 economy (else 0, the base
case). Full cooperation means that in the supergame C was chosen in every
round—Fig. 2 reveals that several pairs achieved it.
The behavior of the initial donor might also influence the first choice of
initial consumers (pooling both treatments, D occurred in 61 out of 192 round
1 meetings). We thus add the categorical variable Round 2 which we set to 0
for a choice taken in round 1 (the base case), and to 1 (resp. 2) for a choice
taken in round 2 after observing C (resp. D). We also include an indicator for
supergame 4 (the second in Phase 2), and standard controls at the individual
level consisting of the subject’s sex and our two standardized measures of
understanding of instructions.
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Table 3: Subject’s Initial Choice in Phase 2: Marginal Effects
Dep. var.
=1 if C (0 if D)
In-Group
Affiliation
Red
Blue
Round 2, C
Round 2, D
Full C in Phase 1
Supergame 4
Controls
N

Equal

Unequal

Coeff.
-0.060

S.E.
(0.084)

Coeff.
-0.055

S.E.
(0.043)

-0.019
0.199***
0.043
-0.049
0.261**
-0.139*
Yes
192

(0.121)
(0.069)
(0.168)
(0.187)
(0.112)
(0.082)

-0.278***
-0.163*
0.121
0.028
0.290***
0.006
Yes
192

(0.071)
(0.084)
(0.143)
(0.087)
(0.057)
(0.051)

Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects (random intercept) at the individual
level and robust standard errors (SE) adjusted for clustering at the session level. One
observation = one producer in rounds 1-2 of supergames 3-4. Dependent variable = 1 if C
chosen, 0 otherwise. Base case = Green producer, out-group, round 1, supergame 3, full
cooperation never experienced in Phase 1. Controls: sex, duration of the previous supergame
(standardized), and two standardized measures of understanding of instructions from the
incentivized post-instruction quiz (response time and wrong answers). Marginal effects are
computed at the regressors’ mean value (at base levels for factor variables). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

We find no evidence that initial choices are conditioned on counterparts’
group affiliation. The In-Group coefficients are small and statistically not different from zero. Thus we can reject H1 because there is no evidence that
social identity effects emerge from the beginning of the supergame. The regression reveals that the subject’s experience in Phase 1 was the main factor
driving initial choices in Phase 2. Those who experienced full cooperation at
least once in Phase 1, are significantly more likely to select C as their first
action as compared to those who never coordinated on full cooperation earlier. The odds of selecting C are significantly higher (almost 30% higher) for a
subject that experienced full cooperation in Phase 1 as compared to someone
who did not.
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It is possible that subjects started to condition their choices on counterparts’ group affiliation later in the supergame, even if they did not do so
initially. To investigate this possibility, it is convenient to study the data in
two kinds of meetings. Those in which the decision-maker had not yet suffered
a defection in the supergame, and those in which they had suffered at least
one defection. We refer to the first type as “equilibrium meetings” and the
second type as “punishment meetings” because, according to theory, here the
producer had a motive to choose D. About 71% of all choices was taken in a
punishment meeting (N=2804, both treatments pooled).
Result 3. Group effects neither emerged in equilibrium meetings nor in punishment meetings of Phase 2.
Fig. 3 and Table 4 provide evidence. Fig. 3 reports average cooperation
rates separately for in- and out-group meetings in each period of Phase 2
supergames (both treatments pooled). One marker corresponds to the average
choice selected by producers in that period, with circles identifying out-group
and triangles in-group meetings. The left panel considers only “equilibrium
meetings,”’ while the right panel only “punishment meetings.” Equilibrium
meetings mostly comprise the few initial periods of the supergame because
defections quickly increased as the game progressed, unlike Phase 1; overall,
by round 3 about 45% of players had suffered a defection, a percentage that
doubles by round 11.16
16

This implies that we have progressively fewer (more) observations as the supergame progresses in the left (right) panel; it also explains we do not have observations past round 22
in the left panel. The vertical dashed line identifies round 18, which is when the random
stopping process started in the supergame.
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Figure 3: Cooperation in- and out-group, in Phase 2
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Notes: One obs.=one producer in a period of supergames 3 and 4 (both treatments pooled).
Each marker reports the cooperation rate averaged across all observations for the period. A
circle marker reports the average cooperation rate in out-group meetings, while a triangle
refers to in-group meetings. Left panel: meetings in which the producer did not suffer D
earlier in the supergame. Right panel: meetings in which the producer suffered D earlier in
the supergame.

On the left panel, cooperation rates for in-group and out-group meetings
both increases as the supergame progresses, and mostly overlap. The overlap
is evident also in the right panel as is the negative trend in cooperativeness.
Overall, Fig. 3 does not reveal a pattern consistent with social identity effects.17
17

Fig. B4 in Appendix B reports a similar illustration that considers all meetings, separating
the data by the producer’s group affiliation. There is a clear decreasing trend for all colors.
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To assess the significance of these visual observations we use a panel logit
regression with random effects. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the
subject cooperated as a producer in a meeting, and is 0 otherwise. The panel
variable is a subject in a session. As Phase 2 economies include all three colors,
we interact the In-group indicator variable with the factor variable Affiliation
capturing the color of the decision maker (Green is the base). As before, we
control for Phase 1 positive experience, using the indicator variable Full C
in Phase 1. In addition, we also add the indicator Previous Outcome taking
value 1 if the outcome was C in the previous round—when the subject was a
consumer—and 0 otherwise (the base case). This allows us to soak up the effect
of recent experience when studying the behavior of producers who suffered a
defection in an earlier round, i.e., in “punishment meetings.”
Table 4 reports the marginal effects on the probability of cooperating, by
treatment. Panel (a) considers choices in equilibrium meetings, while panel
(b) considers choices in punishment meetings. All coefficients on the In-Group
dummy are statistically close to zero. This suggests that individuals did not
generally discriminate based on group affiliation. We can thus reject H2 and
H3 for both treatments.18
18

Here, we relied on a within-subject design to identify group effects in a treatment. As
suggested by a anonymous Referee, an alternative would be a between-subjects design
with a treatment without group identities to be used as benchmark for group effects.

26

Table 4: Cooperation in Phase 2: Marginal Effects
Dep. var.

(a) Equil. meet.

(b) Punish. meet.

=1 if C (0 if D)
In-Group

Equal
-0.123
(0.099)

Unequal
-0.013
(0.026)

Equal
0.024
(0.038)

Unequal
-0.029
(0.027)

0.020
(0.173)
0.055
(0.167)

-0.130
(0.290)
-0.017
(0.147)

0.192***
(0.069)
0.056
(0.067)

-0.026
(0.090)
-0.008
(0.035)

0.268
(0.616)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.043
(0.051)
Yes
645

-0.000
(0.033)
-0.063
(0.045)
-0.031
(0.038)
-0.060*
(0.033)
-0.024
(0.026)
0.145***
(0.011)
0.145***
(0.046)
-0.040***
(0.008)
-0.117***
(0.011)
Yes
1433

0.136*
(0.075)
0.018
(0.079)
0.043
(0.069)
0.035
(0.041)
0.006
(0.046)
0.206***
(0.046)
0.246***
(0.065)
-0.014
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.031)
Yes
1371

Affiliation
Red
Blue
Punishment
Lag 1
Lag 2
Lag 3
Lag 4
Lag 5
Previous Outcome
Full C in Phase 1
Choice #
Supergame=4
Controls
N

0.258***
(0.054)
-0.021***
(0.005)
-0.159***
(0.026)
Yes
475

Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects (random intercept) at the individual
level and robust standard errors (SE) adjusted for clustering at the session level. One
observation = one producer in a round of supergames 3 and 4. Dependent variable =
1 if C chosen, 0 otherwise. Base case = Green player, out-group, previous outcome = D,
supergame 3. Controls: sex and two standardized measures of understanding of instructions
from the incentivized post-instruction quiz (response time and wrong answers). Panel (a):
equilibrium meetings; Panel (b): punishment meetings. Marginal effects are computed at
the regressors’ mean value (at base levels for factor variables). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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It is interesting to compare the trend in cooperation in Phase 2 economies
relative to Phase 1. Recall that in Phase 1 average cooperation exhibited a
positive time trend, evidence that subjects learned to coordinate on efficient
play when they interacted with a fixed parter. Instead, in Phase 2 economies
average cooperation exhibits a significant decreasing trend, evidence that subjects did not manage to learn how to coordinate on efficient play when they
interacted with random parters; all Choice n regressors are negative and significant in Table 4, even when we consider only equilibrium meetings.

6

Discussion

Current thinking in social identity theory suggests that categorization alone
can affect norms of cooperation by inducing social identity or group effects.
Reinforcing group identity via ingroup cooperative tasks might further affect
behavior. We constructed an indefinitely repeated social dilemma experiment
where subjects interact as strangers. The initial categorization was reinforced
with an ingroup cooperative task, and yet we do not detect an impact on group
behavior. Subjects cooperated similarly with insiders and outsiders—they did
not condition their actions on the counterpart’s group affiliation. This holds
true both when group affiliation is payoff irrelevant and when it is not.
What explains this finding? Several possibilities exists. First, earlier studies document that weak forms of group-identity do not influence cooperation
Eckel and Grossman (2005). It is conceivable that our design did not create a
sufficiently strong categorization and Phase 1 interactions did not sufficiently
reinforce group identity. Cooperating in fixed pairs before moving to larger
mixed-color economies may be too weak a form of artificially reinforcing groupidentity. Introducing free-form communication within a group might prove to
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be a more effective way to create a stronger form of group identity, although
the evidence on this is mixed (Chen and Li, 2009). It is also possible that the
number of groups, three in our design instead of the customary two groups,
might have blurred group boundaries. In other words, increasing the number
of groups might progressively weaken the effect of group identity.
An alternative explanation is the impossibility of making group comparisons as subjects could not differentiate the conduct of insiders from those of
outsiders. It is conceivable that group comparison is necessary to make groups
sufficiently meaningful to individuals, when they interact as strangers. In our
design participants faced a random mix of anonymous encounters with outsiders and insiders. Producers could see the consumers’ group affiliation but
were blind to their track records and of the group to which they belonged.
Consumers were blind to the producer’s color so could not determine how
choices depended on group affiliation. This allowed discrimination based on
group affiliation, but prevented its detection. This removed the incentive to
follow a discriminatory strategy—even if group identity was indeed strong—for
two reasons.
On the one hand, by precluding group reputation our design breaks the
feedback effect that likely reinforces pre-existing discriminatory behavior. Being able to assess cooperation at a group level allows punishment to be conditioned on group affiliation. Here, pre-existing biases find a fertile ground
to flourish, as an initial discriminatory action that confirms these biases is
likely to trigger retaliation toward that group. In a way, initial ingroup biases may trigger out-group punishment, which ignites a self-reinforcing spiral
of group effects. The informational opaqueness in our design rules out this
self-reinforcing mechanism.
On the other hand, hiding the decision-maker’s group affiliation equalizes
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the temptation to defect with insiders and outsiders. It also reduces the attractiveness of engaging in ingroup favoritism because that, too, can backfire.
To explain, someone suffering a defection has insufficient information to justify sanctions limited only to outsiders. If so, defecting outgroup induces a
cooperation decline in all future meetings, ingroup and outgroup, without
distinction. Individuals that care about their own group thus have an extra
incentive to avoid discrimination due to spillover effects that would damage
her own group.
These two considerations help reconcile our results with those in Li and
Liu (2017), which finds ingroup favoritism when fixed pairs play an indefinitely
repeated PD game. Instead, we work with groups of twelve individuals who
interact with random insiders and outsiders, as strangers. Decision makers
can discriminate based on group affiliation, but unlike fixed pairs they cannot
compare outsiders’ to insiders behavior. It is possible that precluding group
comparison prevents the creation of a sufficiently strong ingroup bias, or the
reinforcement of pre-existing biases. In fact, this informational opaqueness
ensures that acting in a discriminatory manner towards outsiders can have
spillover effects on insiders. Cheating an outsider can trigger a cascade of
defections that reverberates throughout the economy, lowering payoffs of outsiders and insiders without distinction. The message is that if relative group
performance can be made hard to assess, then this mitigates the impact on
behavior of possible psychological identity biases.
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A
A.1

Appendix
Proof of proposition 1

Here we prove that full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in every group
and treatment. We say that a norm of cooperation is being followed in the
group whenever all players adopt the trigger strategy discussed in Section 4.
For convenience let the defection payoffs be, respectively, d and d − l to a
producer and a consumer. Let ki := 9 + 2i denote the cooperation payoff to a
consumer of type (color) i = 1, 2, 3 under fixed pairs. Indeed we have ki = 13
for all colors in the Equal treatment, while k1 = 11, k2 = 13 and k3 = 15
in the Unequal treatment. Given this notation, a necessary and sufficient
condition for full cooperation to be an equilibrium is reported in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. Fix an economy. Let k + a denote the smallest cooperation payoff
in that economy. If the continuation probability
β ≥ β ∗ :=

d
∈ (0, 1),
a+k−d+l

then full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium.
A type i player alternates between producer and consumer roles, having
the opportunity to earn ki + a every other round, in a cooperative equilibrium.
Let s = 0, 1 denote the role of the player at the start of a round, where 0 is
for a producer and 1 for a consumer. The type of counterparts does not affect
the player’s payoff—only the counterparts’ cooperation rate. In cooperative
equilibrium the player nets
v0 :=

β(a + ki )
1 − β2

and

v1 :=

a + ki
,
1 − β2

while off-equilibrium there is full defection so the payoff is type-invariant and
corresponds to the one associated to infinite repetition of the static Nash
equilibrium, denoted
v̂0 :=

d + β(d − l)
1 − β2

and

v̂1 :=

d − l + βd
.
1 − β2

It is immediate that off-equilibrium a producer has no incentive to deviate
from the sanctioning rule, because defecting is the unique best response to
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every other producer defecting in every round. Hence, we only need to show
that v0 ≥ v̂0 , i.e., in equilibrium the player has no incentive to defect as
a producer, by refusing to help some consumer.19 This inequality can be
d
and the Lemma automatically follows.
rearranged as β ≥ βi∗ :=
a + ki − d + l
Note that β ∗ < 1 because a + ki − (2d − l) > 0 for all player types.
The lowerbound probability β consistent with cooperation is a decreasing
function of the player’s return from cooperation a + ki . Hence β ∗ is the largest
when ki is the lowest. Proposition 1 follows from observing that in the experiment β = 0.75 and the most stringent requirement comes from fixed pairs
(a = 0) composed of players who earn k = 11 points as consumers if the producer cooperates. In this case β1∗ = 0.75 represents the smallest lowerbound
threshold.

19

In the experiment discounting starts on round T = 18, when the random termination rule
started. One can prove that the incentives to cooperate monotonically decline until round
T is reached and then they remain constant. Hence, studying the incentives to cooperate
in equilibrium in round T ensures those incentives are satisfied in all t < T . In round
t = T payoffs correspond to vs above. The details are in Bigoni et al. (2019).
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Appendix: Supplementary Materials for Online Publication
Figure B1: Input Screen, 12-player economies, Unequal treatment

1

Figure B2: Results Screen, 12-player economies, Unequal treatment

2

Table B1: Cooperation in Phase 1: Marginal Effects
Dep. var.: avg. cooper.
Group affiliation
Red
Blue
Controls
Unequal
Supergame 2
Male
Duration
Duration lagged
Response Time
Incorrect Answers
N

Equal

Unequal

Coeff.

S.E.

0.207
-0.012

(0.133) 0.051
(0.138) 0.053

0.179***
-0.006
-0.023
0.005
0.034
-0.153***
96

(0.053)
(0.106)
(0.019)
(0.007)
(0.040)
(0.036)

Coeff.

0.175***
0.139***
0.013
0.043*
0.024
0.022
96

S.E.

Pooled
Coeff.

S.E.

-0.020
0.158***
0.130
0.000
0.032**
0.046
-0.064*
192

(0.069)
(0.030)
(0.093)
(0.019)
(0.016)
(0.047)
(0.036)

(0.075)
(0.060)

(0.036)
(0.053)
(0.032)
(0.023)
(0.089)
(0.032)

Notes: GLM regression on the average cooperation rate in a supergame. One obs.=one
economy in supergames 1 and 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
clustering at the session level. Duration lagged is set to 18 in supergame 1. Marginal effects
are computed at the regressors’ mean value (at base levels for factor variables). Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. When
considering the Equal treatment, the coefficient on Red is different from Blue (Wald test,
p-value=0.0339).
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Figure B3: Cooperation in Supergames of Phase 1
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Notes: One obs.=one producer in a period of supergames 1 and 2. Each marker reports
the cooperation rate averaged across all observations for the period. All economies had a
common minimum duration of 18 rounds. A circle marker reports the average cooperation
rate of Green producers, a triangle refers to Red producers, and a square refers to Blue
producers. Left panel: Equal treatment. Right panel: Unequal treatment.
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Figure B4: Cooperation in Supergames of Phase 2
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Notes: One obs.=one producer in a period of supergames 3 and 4. Each marker reports
the cooperation rate averaged across all observations for the period. All economies had a
common minimum duration of 18 rounds. A circle marker reports the average cooperation
rate of Green producers, a triangle refers to Red producers, and a square refers to Blue
producers. Left panel: Equal treatment. Right panel: Unequal treatment.
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